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In a widely publicized case in 2010, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Illinois Silent 
Reflection and Student Prayer Act.1 In doing so, the court reversed the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois’ 
determination that the statute mandating a daily “period of silence” for 
reflection or prayer in the Illinois public school system conflicted with 
the Constitution.2 The lower court had, in fact, found the Act to be 
unconstitutional on two separate grounds: first, the statute’s lack of a 
secular purpose violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2012, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., 2008, University of Notre Dame. 
1 See Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch (Sherman II), 623 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
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Amendment;3 and second, the Act violated the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment as a result of its vague language.4  
The Seventh Circuit’s review of the case went to great lengths to 
explain the constitutionality of the statute under the Establishment 
Clause.5 Its analysis of the void for vagueness issue, however, gave 
short shrift as to how the statute provided the clarity needed to pass 
constitutional muster.6 Indeed, the court’s scant analysis failed to 
mention certain key rules for construing the statutory language of the 
Act. Even the lone dissenting voice made no mention of the void for 
vagueness issue in her opinion, taking issue only with the 
constitutionality of the statute under the Establishment Clause.7 
Although the statute abounds with vagueness—as illustrated by its 
failure to define a “brief period” and its lack of a mechanism for 
enforcement8—the Seventh Circuit never adequately addressed how 
the statute withstood the void for vagueness challenge.9 
This Comment will explore the history of moment of silence 
legislation in the United States; recount the details of the Illinois 
legislation and the litigation that followed it; and examine the void for 
vagueness doctrine and its application to the Illinois Silent Reflection 
and Student Prayer Act. Applying the void for vagueness doctrine to 
the Act will reveal the neglect in the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning and 
ultimately demonstrate how the Act remains void for vagueness under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, this 
Comment will assess the broader problems raised by the 
misapplication of the void for vagueness doctrine to pieces of 
legislation.  
                                                 
3Sherman ex rel. Sherman v.  Twp. High Sch. Dist. 214 (Sherman I), 594 F. 
Supp. 2d 981, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2009), rev’d, Sherman II, 623 F.3d 501. 
4 Sherman I,594 F. Supp. at 992.  
5 Sherman II, 623 F.3d at 507–19.  
6Id. at 519–20.  
7 Id. at 520 (Williams, J., dissenting).  
8 See Illinois Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act, 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
20/1 (2007).  
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I. BACKGROUND: MOMENT OF SILENCE LEGISLATION GENERALLY 
 
While prayer in public schools may seem wholly inappropriate for 
the modern day, state-mandated prayer continues to exist today— 
cleverly disguised as a “moment” or “period” of silence. In fact, at 
least thirty-two states have introduced “moment of silence” legislation 
into the public school systems.10 Though the Supreme Court has dealt 
with several school prayer cases over the years,11 it has only once 
ruled on a statute requiring a moment of silence in public schools in  
the 1985 case of Wallace v. Jaffree.12 Wallace involved an Alabama 
statute that read:  
 
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all 
grades in all public schools the teacher in charge of the room 
in which each class is held may announce that a period of 
silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be 
observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any 
such period no other activities shall be engaged in.13 
 
The Court examined whether the statute violated the 
Establishment Clause by applying the Lemon test, which requires that 
“[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive 
                                                 
10 States with Moment of Silence Statutes, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/magazine/momentofsilence.htm (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2011). 
11 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (finding unconstitutional 
legislation requiring students to recite a state-composed prayer each day in part 
because the governmental establishment of prayer “was one of the reasons which 
caused many of our early colonists to leave England and seek religious freedom in 
America.”) 
12472 U.S. 38 (1985).  




Vales: Stuck in a Moment (of Silence): The Seventh Circuit's Misapplicat
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2011
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 6, Issue 2                         Spring 2011 
 
government entanglement with religion.”14 Unable to determine 
whether the statutory text disclosed a secular purpose, the Court 
sought guidance from the legislative history.15  
The Court’s examination revealed that the Alabama legislature 
made little effort to hide the sectarian purpose of the statute.16 For 
example, in 1982, the legislature added a provision allowing teachers 
to lead their students in the prayer with the following statement, 
“Almighty God, you alone are our God.”17 Further, the leading 
sponsor of the legislation, Senator Donald Holmes, declared at an 
evidentiary hearing that the Alabama statute was a “step in the right 
direction” for the “effort to return voluntary prayer to our public 
schools.”18 Furthermore, Senator Holmes later testified that he had “no 
other [secular] purpose in mind” for the statute.19 As a result, the 
Court stopped its analysis after the first prong of the Lemon test, 
finding that the statute clearly lacked a secular 20purpose.   
                                                
In her concurrence, however, Justice O’Connor indicated her 
general acceptance toward moment of silence statutes and implied that 
these statutes could pass constitutional muster in other cases.21 Justice 
O’Connor wrote:  
 
First, a moment of silence is not inherently religious. Silence, 
unlike prayer or Bible reading, need not be associated with a 
religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a 
moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. 
During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer 
 
14 Id. at 55–56 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (establishing a test to determine 
whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the 
Constitution).  
15 Id. at 56.  
16 Id. at 56–57.   
17 Id. at 40 n.3. 
18 Id. at 43.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 56.  
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is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to 
listen to the prayers or thoughts of others.22 
 
While the Supreme Court has only confronted one moment of 
silence case, the circuit courts have faced the issue on multiple 
occasions and have expressed widely varying treatments of moment of 
silence legislation.23 For example, in the same year that the Supreme 
Court struck down the Alabama statute in Wallace v. Jaffree, the Third 
Circuit similarly invalidated a New Jersey moment of silence statute 
on constitutional grounds.24 The statute, which simply made school 
prayer optional, stated that:  
 
Principals and teachers in each public elementary and 
secondary school of each school district in this State shall 
permit students to observe a 1 minute period of silence to be 
used solely at the discretion of the individual student, before 
opening exercises of each school day for quiet and private 
contemplation or introspection.25 
 
While the Third Circuit found that the statute neither fostered 
“excessive government entanglement with religion,” nor advanced or 
prohibited religion, the statute nonetheless failed the Lemon test based 
on its lack of a secular purpose.26 Although the state insisted that that 
the statute “provide[d] a transition from nonschool life to school life,” 
the Third Circuit remained unconvinced.27 Instead, the court looked at 
the legislative history of the statute, finding a record of attempts to 
encourage prayer in the schools. The court adopted the district court’s 
                                                 
22 Id. at 72 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
23Christine Rienstra Kiracofe, Pretending Not to Pray?: A Historical Overview 
of Moment of Silence Legislation and Why Illinois’ Statute Clearly Violated the 
Lemon Test, 241 ED. L. REP. 1, 1 (2009). 
24 May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985).  
25Id. at 241.    
26Id. at 253 . 
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finding that the purpose was religious because it “requir[ed] school 
districts to accommodate those students desiring the opportunity to 
engage in prayer at some point during the school day.”28 
Several years later, the Fifth Circuit invalidated a moment of 
silence type statute in Doe v. School Board of Ouachita Parish.29 This 
case involved an amendment to a Louisiana statute, which provided 
that:  
 
Each parish and city school board in the state shall permit the 
proper school authorities of each school within its jurisdiction 
to allow an opportunity, at the start of each school day, for 
those students and teachers desiring to do so to observe a 
brief time in prayer or meditation.30  
 
Taking a cue from the Supreme Court’s analysis in Wallace, the 
court looked to the legislative intent behind the statute.31 Upon doing 
so, it found that the bill’s sponsors basically conceded that the statute 
was “an instrument to allow verbal prayer in schools.”32 As a result, 
the Louisiana statute failed to exhibit a secular purpose, and the statute 
failed the first prong of the Lemon test. 33 The Fifth Circuit’s 
invalidation of the Louisiana statute thus formed the first invalidation 
of a moment of silence statute since 1985.34  
While just one moment of silence statute was found 
unconstitutional in the past twenty-five years, several have managed to 
pass constitutional muster.35 For instance, in 1997, the Eleventh 
                                                 
28 Id. at 252.  
29 274 F.3d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 2001).  
30 Id. at 291.  
31 Id. at 293–94. 
32 Id. at 294.  
33 Id. at 295.  
34 Kiracofe, supra note 23, at 10.  
35 See, e.g., Bown v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 
1997); Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001); Croft v. Perry, 562 F.3d 735 
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Circuit upheld a Georgia statute that mandated daily prayer in 
schools.36 The Act provided in pertinent part that: 
 
(a) In each public school classroom, the teacher in charge 
shall, at the opening of school upon every school day, 
conduct a brief period of quiet reflection for not more than 60 
seconds with the participation of all the pupils therein 
assembled. 
(b) The moment of quiet reflection authorized by subsection 
(a) of this code section is not intended to be and shall not be 
conducted as a religious service or exercise but shall be 
considered as an opportunity for a moment of silent reflection 
on the anticipated activities of the day.37 
 
Upon analyzing the statute, the Eleventh Circuit found that it passed 
all three prongs of the Lemon test.38 Following the Supreme Court’s 
example from Wallace, the court first looked at the legislative history 
to discern whether the statute possessed a secular purpose.39 Although 
the court uncovered legislative support for the bill as an effort to 
“reinstitute school prayer,” it ultimately accepted the given secular 
purpose of the statute, which was to “provide students with an 
opportunity for a brief period of quiet reflection before beginning the 
day’s activities.”40 The Court reasoned that the religiously-oriented 
legislative history was not inconsistent with the secular purpose of the 
statute because other legislators did not possess this same religious 
desire for the statute.41  
In 2001, the Fourth Circuit in Brown v. Gilmore upheld a moment 
of silence statute from Virginia.42 The statute required that:  
                                                 
36 Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d at 1466. 
37 Id..  
38 Id. at 1474. 
39Id. at 1469.  
40Id. at 1471–72.  
41Id.  
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In order that the right of every pupil to the free exercise of 
religion be guaranteed within the schools and that the 
freedom of each individual pupil be subject to the least 
possible pressure from the Commonwealth either to engage 
in, or to refrain from, religious observation on school 
grounds, the school board of each school division shall 
establish the daily observance of one minute of silence in 
each classroom of the division.  
During such one-minute period of silence, the teacher 
responsible for each classroom shall take care that all pupils 
remain seated and silent and make no distracting display to 
the end that each pupil may, in the exercise of his or her 
individual choice, meditate, pray, or engage in any other 
silent activity which does not interfere with, distract, or 
impede other pupils in the like exercise of individual 
choice.43 
 
Similar to the Bown court, the Fourth Circuit began by looking to the 
legislative intent during its application of the Lemon test.44 Just as in 
Bown, the Court of Appeals uncovered some religious comments about 
the purpose of the statute. For instance, Senator Warren Barry 
“hope[d] that encouraging regular introspection by students would 
somehow lessen the urges of students to resort to violence,” explaining 
that “[t]his country was based on belief in God, and maybe we need to 
look at that again.”45 Nonetheless, the court pointed out that Wallace 
did not require an “exclusively secular” purpose to satisfy the first 
prong of the Lemon test.46 Rather, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wallace demonstrated that “even though a statute may have a religious 
purpose, it may still satisfy the Lemon test if it also has a ‘clearly 
                                                 
43 Id. at 271 n.1.  
44 Id. at 275.  
45 Id. at 271.  
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secular purpose.’”47 The Court of Appeals further pointed to the 
“clearly secular purpose” of the Act at hand, reasoning that it provided 
religious accommodation.48 The court bolstered its finding by pointing 
to the Virginia superintendent of schools’ comment that the moment of 
quiet is “a good classroom management tool” that “works as a good 
transition, enabling students to pause, settle down, compose 
themselves, and focus on the day ahead.”49 
In a more recent example, the Fifth Circuit weighed in on a 
moment of silence statute in the case of Croft v. Perry.50 The court 
reviewed an amendment to a Texas school prayer statute, which 
changed prayer from permissive to mandatory. The statute provided, in 
pertinent part, that:  
 
The board of trustees of each school district shall provide for 
the observance of one minute of silence at each school in the 
district following the recitation of the pledges of allegiance to 
the United States and Texas flags. . . . During the one-minute 
period, each student may, as the student chooses, reflect, pray, 
meditate, or engage in any other silent activity that is not 
likely to interfere with or distract another student. Each 
teacher or other school employee in charge of students during 
that period shall ensure that each of those students remain 
silent and does not act in a manner that is likely to interfere 
with or distract another student.51 
 
Once again, this court looked to the legislative history of the Act in 
applying the Lemon test.52 The court ultimately found that the Act 
passed the first prong of the test, agreeing with Governor Rick Perry 
that the statute possessed the secular purposes of fostering thoughtful 
                                                 
47 Id.   
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 277.   
50 562 F.3d 735 (5th Cir. 2009).  
51 Id. at 739 (emphasis omitted).  
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contemplation and promoting patriotism by conducting the moment 
after the recitation of the pledge of allegiance.53 
Recognizing that another possible motivation behind the statute 
rested with the legislature’s desire to reinstitute school prayer, the 
Court stressed that the objectives behind a statute need not be wholly 
secular.54 Similar to the Brown court’s reasoning, the Court of Appeals 
emphasized the possibility that a statute can possess both a secular 
purpose and a religious motive.55  
Thus, the circuit courts have reached varying outcomes on the 
matter of moment of silence statutes. While all of the courts seem to 
look at the legislative intent to decipher the purpose of the statute, it 
seems that each court either emphasizes or dismisses religious 
statements in order to reach their desired result—either striking down 
or upholding moment of silence legislation based on their own 
viewpoints.  
 
II. ILLINOIS MOMENT OF SILENCE LEGISLATION 
 
Moment of silence legislation has existed for more than forty 
years in the state of Illinois.56 During this time, however, the 
legislation experienced several key changes, the most significant of 
which was the shift from optional to mandatory adherence in the 
public schools. In 1969, Illinois first enacted the statute that provided 
Illinois public schools with the option to observe a “period of 
silence.”57 The original statute provided that: 
 
In each public school classroom, the teacher in charge may 
observe a brief period of silence with the participation of all 
the pupils therein assembled at the opening of every school 
day. This period shall not be conducted as a religious exercise 
                                                 
53 Id. at 750; Kiracofe, supra note 23, at 11. 
54 Croft, 562 F.3d at 742.  
55 Id. at 742–43.   
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but shall be an opportunity for silent prayer or for silent 
reflection on the anticipated activities of the day.58 
 
In 1990, as part of the Act that called for short titles of Illinois 
statutes, the Illinois legislature entitled the statute “the Silent 
Reflection Act.”59 Aside from the title change, however, the Act 
remained unchanged until 2002.60  
In 2002, the Illinois legislature amended the statute to include 
Section 5, which clarified students’ right to religious freedom.61 
Effective in 2003, this addition made clear the student’s right to 
silently pray in a non-disruptive way, as well as the right to be free 
from religious pressure from the State either to engage in or refrain 
from religious activity.62 Section 5 provided in full that:  
 
In order that the right of every student to the free exercise of 
religion is guaranteed within the public schools and that each 
student has the freedom to not be subject to pressure from the 
State either to engage in or to refrain from religious 
observation on public school grounds, students in the public 
schools may voluntarily engage in individually initiated, non-
disruptive prayer that, consistent with the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses of the United States and Illinois 
Constitutions, is not sponsored, promoted, or endorsed in any 
manner by the school or any school employee.63 
 
Aside from the adoption of Section 5, the Illinois legislature also 
changed the title of the Act from “the Silent Reflection Act” to “the 
Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act.”64 While no legislative 
                                                 
58 Id. at 504–05. 
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history indicates why exactly the title changed, the ACLU pointed out 
in a memorandum that this change closely resembled the 
unconstitutional “moment of silence” statute in Wallace v. Jaffree.65 In 
that case, Alabama amended the language of a statute from 
“meditation” to “meditation or voluntary prayer.”66 Observing that this 
change in language was either made “to convey a message of state 
endorsement and promotion of prayer” or “for no purpose,” the Court 
easily concluded that “[t]he addition of ‘or voluntary prayer’ 
indicate[d] that the State intended to characterize prayer as a favored 
practice.”67 
In spite of the name change and the addition of Section 5, the Act 
stayed substantively the same until 2007. In 2007, the Illinois 
legislature amended the statute to change the once optional period of 
silence to a mandatory period of silence, through the deliberate change 
of wording in the statute from “may” to “shall.”68 Section 1 of the Act 
became:  
 
In each public school classroom the teacher in charge shall 
observe a brief period of silence with the participation of all 
the pupils therein assembled at the opening of every school 
day. This period shall be an opportunity for silent prayer or 
for silent reflection on the anticipated activities of the day.”69  
 
The Senate sponsor of the bill, Senator Lightford, explained that 
the change would “create uniformity across the State in all of our 
schools” so that all students would receive the same opportunity for 
silent reflection or prayer.70 Though she offered this secular purpose 
                                                 
65 Memorandum of Amicus Curiae the ACLU of Illinois in Support Of 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Sherman I, 594 F. Supp. 2d 981, (N.D. 
Ill. 2009) (No. 07 C 6048), 2008 WL 5973406.  
66 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 58 (1985). 
67 Id. at 60.  
68 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 20/1 (2007).   
69 Id.  
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for the statute, Lightford revealed other intentions for the act when she 
told a journalist that, “Here in the General Assembly we open every 
day with a prayer and Pledge of Allegiance. I don’t get a choice about 
that. I don’t see why students should have a choice.”71  
The House debate over the new amendments to Illinois’ moment 
of silence legislation reflected mixed emotions. The House sponsor, 
Representative Will Davis, viewed the statute as “nothing more than 
what [the teacher] . . . would already do in the morning to try to get the 
young people settled down so that they can begin their day.”72 
Conversely, another representative believed that “[t]he only reason 
[she] can see for requiring this silent moment is to encourage prayer in 
the public schools,” pointing to the comments of Senator Lightford to 
the press as further support of this idea.73 
Despite the disagreement during the House debate, the bill 
amending the statute ultimately passed in 2007.74 After the passage, 
however, the now infamous Governor Blagojevich vetoed the 
amendment after observing the religious motivations behind the 
statute.75 Evidently, the Governor worried that changing the statute 
could raise constitutional questions.76 The Illinois legislature, 
nonetheless, overrode Governor Blagojevich’s veto, and on October 
11, 2007, the amendment went into effect—thus mandating a period of 





                                                 
71 Eric Zorn, Mandatory Silence Sends Loud Message, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 27, 
2007; see Memorandum of Amicus Curiae the ACLU of Illinois in Support Of 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Sherman I, 594 F. Supp. 2d 981, (N.D. 
Ill. 2009) (No. 07 C 6048), 2008 WL 5973406. 
72 H.R. Proceedings, 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., May 31, 2007, at 67. 
73 Id. at 64 (statement of Rep. Currie). 
74 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 20/1 (2007).   
75 Governor's Message to 95th Ill. Gen. Assem. on S.B. 1463, Aug. 28, 2007. 
76 Id.  
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SHERMAN V. KOCH 
 
On October 26, 2007, approximately two weeks after the 
amendment took effect, Dawn S. Sherman, through her father, Robert 
I. Sherman,78 filed suit against her high school, District 214, alleging 
that the statute violated her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.79 
Sherman sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, launching an attack on Section 1 of the Silent Reflection and 
Student Prayer Act for being facially invalid under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.80  
Shortly after filing suit, Sherman amended her complaint, refiling 
it as a class action complaint against Township High School District 
214 and Dr. Christopher Koch in his role as State Superintendent of 
Education.81 As a class action, Sherman sought to enjoin the statute’s 
application in any school.82 Sherman attacked Section 1 as facially 
invalid for two reasons: first, Sherman asserted that the statute was 
facially invalid under the First Amendment for effecting an 
establishment of religion; and second, Sherman alleged that the statute 
was facially invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment for being 
unconstitutionally vague, thus in violation of due process.83 
On November 14, 2007, the Northern District of Illinois denied a 
motion to dismiss filed by Dr. Koch.84 The court rejected Dr. Koch’s 
argument that he was not a proper defendant in the case due to his role 
                                                 
78Robert I. Sherman is a well-known atheist and has filed countless lawsuits 
regarding the separation of church and state. Here, he used his daughter to gain 
standing. See ROB SHERMAN, http://www.robsherman.com (last visited May 2, 
2011). 
79 Sherman II, 623 F.3d at 505.  
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 504.  
82 Id. at 505–506.  
83 Id. at 505.  
84Sherman ex rel. Sherman v.  Twp. High Sch. Dist. 214, 624 F. Supp. 2d 907, 
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as state superintendent.85 The court explained that Dr. Koch “is 
entrusted “[t]o supervise all the public schools in the state,”86 and, as 
such, “presumably these powers would include the authority to compel 
school districts to comply with state laws such as the statute in 
question.”87 
At this time, Sherman also sought a preliminary injunction to stop 
the implementation and enforcement of the Act, which the Northern 
District of Illinois granted.88 The court reasoned that without an 
injunction, the plaintiff and her fellow students would “suffer 
irreparable harm in the possible violation of their Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clause rights.”89 The court further explained that the 
potential harm to students “greatly outweigh[ed] any harm to Illinois 
schools . . . because teachers and school districts would merely resume 
their activities as conducted before the statute took effect in 
October.”90 Additionally, the court indicated that the preliminary 
injunction also served the interest of the public.91  
In its initial assessment of Sherman’s argument that the Act was 
void for vagueness, the court held that Sherman had “established a 
likelihood” that she would be successful in her argument that the Act 
was unconstitutionally vague.92 The court noted that 
 
[T]he statute provides no direction whatever as to: how the 
period of silence should be implemented (e.g. whether the 
purpose of the period of silence should be explained to the 
pupils); what time of day the period of silence should occur 
(does the “opening” of the school day mean as soon as the 
pupils enter the classroom, after the pledge of allegiance, or 
                                                 
85Id.  
86Id. (citation omitted).  
87Id.  
88Id. at 910–13.  
89Id. at 913.  
90Id. at 913.  
91Id.  
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some other time before the beginning of class?); how long the 
period of silence should last (two seconds; two minutes?); 
and whether pupils are permitted to move about the room 
during the period of silence or whether they must stand at or 
sit in their seats.93  
 
Additionally, the court noted that the statutory language of “quiet” and 
“silence” were each highly subjective in nature.94  
Moreover, the district court emphasized that the statute lacked any 
enforcement mechanism for noncompliance.95 Specifically, the court 
found that the statute neglected to outline penalties for students who 
do not comply with the period of silence in the classroom and for 
school districts that fail to implement and enforce the statute.96 While 
admitting that possible constitutional applications of the Act existed, 
the court highlighted the “potential chilling effect on First Amendment 
Rights” that could occur in the absence of the injunction.97 
Following the grant of the preliminary injunction, the district 
court granted leave to the ACLU of Illinois to appear as amici curiae 
on behalf of Sherman, and also granted leave to the Alliance Defense 
Fund to appear as amici curiae on behalf of defendants Koch and 
District 214.98 Thereafter, Sherman filed a motion to certify bilateral 
classes for plaintiff and defendants, and the Alliance Defense Fund, 
joined by the defendants, filed a motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint due to lack of Article III standing.99 On March 28, 2008, the 
district court granted the plaintiff’s motion for class certification and 
                                                 
93 Id. at 911. 
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 911–912.  
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 912.  
98 Sherman ex rel. Sherman v.  Twp. High Sch. Dist. 214 (Sherman III), 540 F. 
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denied the Alliance Defense Fund and the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.100  
In response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court upheld 
Sherman’s standing as proper, explaining that, “the Act is directed 
specifically at plaintiff and her fellow pupils” because they are the 
individuals that “must consider using the mandatory moment of 
silence” either for prayer or silent reflection.101 In this manner, 
Sherman suffered a “direct and personal” injury from the mandatory 
moment of silence, and therefore possessed standing to bring the 
action.102Moreover, the court pointed to a history of case precedent 
affirming that “public school students like plaintiff have been accorded 
standing to challenge statutes like the Act, that allegedly violate the 
Establishment Clause.”103  
Upon its granting of Sherman’s motion for bilateral class 
certification, the court certified a class of defendants made up of “all 
public school districts in the State of Illinois, all of which are required 
to implement the daily ‘period of silence’ mandated by 105 ILCS 
20/1” and represented by District 214.104 Most significantly, the court 
found that the defendant class satisfied the requirement of typicality 
and that the named defendants would “fairly and adequately represent 
the class.”105 Despite variations in the factual circumstances among 
the schools in the state, the court found that all schools in the state 
faced the task of implementation—thus, satisfying the class 
                                                 
100Id.  
101Id..  
102Id. at 990.  
103 Id. at 989–90. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Sherman ex 
rel. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Twp., 980 F.2d 437 (7th 
Cir.1992). 
104Sherman III, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 990. 
105 Both parties agreed that a defendant class composed of all Illinois public 
school districts satisfied two out of the four requirements for class certification: 
numerosity and commonality. Id. Defendant Superintendent Koch took issue only 
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certification requirement of typicality.106 With regard to adequacy of 
representation, the court found that Koch and District 214 satisfied th
requirement because of their vigor with regard to the cas 107
e 
e.   
                                                
The court also held that the plaintiff’s class certification satisfied 
both the typicality and representation requirements.108 In terms of 
typicality, the court found that regardless of how each student viewed 
the Act, “all class members have an interest in being subject only to 
laws that pass constitutional muster.”109 Further, in terms of adequacy 
of representation, the court held that the plaintiff’s vigor demonstrated 
her ability to serve as class representative.110 Following class 
certification in March of 2008, on January 21, 2009, the district court 
found in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the Illinois Silent 
Reflection and Student Prayer Act violated the Constitution.111 
Specifically, the court found that the Act violated both the 
Establishment Clause and the Due Process Clause.  
The court explained that the Act violated the Establishment 
Clause by failing to satisfy the requirements of the Lemon test.112 
Specifically, the Act failed the first prong of the test due to its lack of a 
“clear secular purpose.”113 The court held that any attempt by the Act 
to define a secular purpose was merely a sham, as demonstrated most 
clearly through the legislative history of the Act.114 In addition, the 
 
106 In support of its finding regarding typicality, the court pointed to Brown v. 
Kelly, 244 F.R.D. 222, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[I]f such factual distinctions could 
preclude findings of commonality and typicality under Rule 23(a), they would be the 
death knell for class actions challenging the systemic enforcement of an 
unconstitutional statute.”). Id. at 992. 
107Id. at 992–93.  
108Id. at 993.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Sherman I, 594 F. Supp. 2d 981, 993 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
112 Id. at 990.  
113 Id. at 989.  
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court also explained that the Act failed the second prong of the Lemon 
test because its primary effect was to advance religion.115 
The court also held that the statute’s lack of clarity rendered it 
void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.116 Here, the court reflected back to its prior ruling, 
reiterating its determination that the statute “provide[d] no direction as 
to how the ‘period’ of silence should be implemented, how long the 
period should last, and whether pupils would be permitted to pay in a 
manner that was either audible or requirement movement.”117  
The court rejected the defendants’ argument that any deficiencies 
in clarity were merely “de minimus” or “immaterial.”118 The court 
further rejected the defendants’ claim that the statute’s lack of clarity 
actually provided teachers with necessary discretion in the 
classroom.119 The defendants argued that the Act called for a liberal 
construction so that teachers could enforce the Act without having to 
discuss the purposes of it.120 The court rejected the defendants’ broad 
construction of the statutory language, pointing to the principle that 
compliance with the Establishment Clause takes precedence over the 
general principle of affording deference to statutes in the schools.121  
The court favored a narrow construction of the act because of the 
unique relationship between students and the public school system.122 
Citing to the Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Aguillard, the 
court explained that “[s]tudents in such institutions are impressionable 
and their attendance is involuntary, and the State exerts great authority 
and coercive power as a result of mandatory attendance requirements, 
student’s emulation of teachers as role modes [sic], and the children’s 
                                                 
115 Id. at 990.  
116 Id. at 992.  
117 Id. at 990.  
118 Id. at 990–91.  
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 991.  
121 Id.  
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susceptibility to peer pressure.”123 The court reasoned that it had an 
obligation to maintain the trust among families and public schools, 
such that the “classroom will not purposely be used to advance 
religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student 
and his or her family.”124 In order to maintain this trust, such an act 
must be construed narrowly, so as not to infringe upon the 
constitutional rights of impressionable, young children.125 By relying 
upon this method of interpretation, the court found that the Act was, 
indeed, void for vagueness.126 
 
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S REVIEW OF SHERMAN V. KOCH 
 
 On October 15, 2010, the Seventh Circuit reversed and 
remanded the district court’s ruling.127 Specifically, the court held that 
Section 1 of the Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act did not “have 
the principal or primary effect of promoting religion,” nor was it 
unconstitutionally vague.128 In its opinion, authored by Judge Daniel 
Manion, the court of appeals held that the Act passed the Lemon test 
and, indeed, spent most of its analysis addressing this issue.129 While 
thoroughly explaining the Establishment Clause issue, the court gave 
short shrift to the Due Process Clause issue.130  
With regard to the void for vagueness issue, the court found that 
the Act possessed sufficient clarity to pass constitutional muster.131 
The court began its analysis by citing to the rule that “[t]he void for 
                                                 
123 Id. at 991 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987)). 
124 Id.  
125 Id.  
126 Id. at 992.  
127 Sherman II, 623 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 2010). 
128 Id. at 504.  
129 See id. at 507–19.  
130 The court devoted pages 507–519 of its analysis to the issue of the 
constitutionality of the statute under the Establishment Clause, while devoting just 
one page, 519–520, to the issue of the constitutionality of the statute according to the 
void for vagueness doctrine. See id. at 507-520.  
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vagueness doctrine rests on the basic principle of due process that a 
law is unconstitutional if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.”132 
From there, the court directed its rule statement toward a more liberal 
construction of the statute, citing that “[t]he Due Process 
Clause . . . does not demand perfect clarity and precise guidance.”133 
The court further noted that “a statute is only unconstitutionally vague 
if it fails to define the offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary 
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and it fails to 
establish standards to permit enforcement in a nonarbitrary, 
nondiscriminatory manner.”134  
The court also indicated that the civil nature of the statute 
warranted a higher tolerance for vagueness.135 Citing the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, the court 
explained that “the degree of vagueness that the Constitution 
tolerates—as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair 
enforcement—depends in part on the nature of the enactment.”136 A 
statute that is civil in nature is allowed more vagueness than a criminal 
statute where “the consequences of imprecision are more severe.”137 
The court also emphasized that the Act tolerated more vagueness 
because of the general rule that legislation affecting schools should 
allow for teacher discretion.138 Similarly, the court noted that “school 
disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code.”139 
Finally, the court stressed that, “in a facial vagueness challenge the 
question is whether the statute is vague in all its operations.”140  
                                                 
132 Id. at 519 (quoting Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1999).  
133 Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
134 Id. (quoting Fuller ex rel. Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. 
Dist. 61, 251 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
135Id. at 520.  
136 Id. at 519–520 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982)). 
137Id. at 520 (quoting Karlin, 188 F.3d. at 458).  
138Id.  
139 Id. at 520 (quoting Fuller, 251 F.3d at 667).  
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After establishing its tendency toward a broad construction, the 
court applied the rules regarding vagueness to the statute. While 
conceding that “Section 1 does not define the length of the period of 
silence,”141 the court quickly followed this concession by noting that 
Section 1 “is not unconstitutionally vague in all its applications, as 
demonstrated by District 214’s proposed implementation of the 
statute.”142 District 214 planned to implement the Act by announcing 
each morning throughout its schools that it would “have a brief period 
of silence,” which would be followed fifteen seconds later by the 
Pledge of Allegiance.143 After explaining District 214’s planned 
implementation, the court noted that, “[a] student of ordinary 
intelligence would clearly understand that he is to remain silent for the 
fifteen seconds between the announcement and the beginning of the 
Pledge.”144 The court supported its interpretation by reemphasizing the 
school setting of the legislation, explaining that “the Constitution does 
not mandate a cornucopia of additional details or a statement of the 
punishment students will face should they disregard their teacher’s 
direction.”145 As a result, the court determined that Sherman “cannot 
complain of the vagueness of the law in every situation and her Due 
Process challenge fails.”146  
Although Judge Ann Williams filed a dissenting opinion in the 
court of appeals decision, her dissent made no mention of whether the 
statute was void for vagueness.147 Instead, Judge Williams argued only 
that the statute violated the Establishment Clause because it 
encouraged prayer in public schools and, as a result, failed the Lemon 
test.148 
 







147 See id. at 520–25 (Williams, J., dissenting).    
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V. WHAT EXACTLY IS THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE? 
 
A statute that is void for vagueness is unconstitutional because it 
violates due process of law.149 Due process requires fairness in the 
legal system and that notice and the opportunity for a fair trial are 
provided to all.150 Historically, a statute that is void for vagueness is 
one which fails to provide notice: it is one “which either forbids or 
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ 
as to its application.”151 
The void for vagueness doctrine is perhaps best summarized in 
the words of Justice Frankfurter, who famously stated that 
“indefiniteness is not a quantitative concept. It is not even a technical 
concept of definite components. It is itself an indefinite concept.”152 
This indefinite doctrine lacks a uniform definition and is often 
described in a roundabout manner. Consequently, courts apply the 
doctrine in widely varying ways.153  
The history of the void for vagueness doctrine, however, sheds 
some light into the rationale behind this ambiguous concept. Though 
absent from the debates of the Constitutional Convention, the concept 
of void for vagueness existed in the United States as early as the 
nineteenth century, when it was referred to by the Supreme Court in 
the 1891 case of United States v. Brewer.154 Though the doctrine did 
not yet have constitutional force, the court laid the groundwork for the 
void for vagueness doctrine by explaining that “[l]aws which create 
                                                 
149 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).   
150
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
151 Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.  
152 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
153See Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to 
the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 261 
(2010) (explaining that “the required certainty that shields a law from a court 
determination that it is unconstitutionally vague is uncertain itself.”). 
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crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penalties may 
know what acts it is their duty to avoid.”155  
Though it is difficult to identify exactly when the void for 
vagueness doctrine gained constitutional backing, Nash v. United 
States156 may have been one of the first cases to link the doctrine to 
the constitutional requirements of due process.157 In finding that the 
Nash statute possessed sufficient clarity, Justice Holmes noted that 
there was “no constitutional difficulty in the way of enforcing the 
criminal part of the act.”158 In other words, since the statute was not 
too vague, it complied with the Due Process requirement in the 
Constitution. Moreover, the Court’s 1921 decision in United States
L. Cohen Grocery further tied the doctrine to the constitution when it 
invalidated a vague economic regulation, explaining that it wa




                                                
159 In 1926, the Court in Conna
explicitly defined the doctrine in constitutional terms, explaining that 
“a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms 
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential 
of [the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause].”160  
In the early twentieth century, litigants often used the void for 
vagueness doctrine to attack economic regulations.161 For example, in 
Connally, the Court invalidated an Oklahoma wage statute because of 
its uncertain wording.162 Specifically, the Court took issue with the 
statute’s use of the phrase “current rate of wages,” because it “[did] 
not denote a specific or definite sum, but minimum, maximum, and 
 
155United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 288 (1891).  
156229 U.S. 373 (1913). 
157 Lockwood, supra note 152, at 268 (tracing constitutional origins of the 
Void for Vagueness Doctrine).  
158 Nash, 229 U.S. at 378. 
159 Lockwood, supra note 152, at 264–65 (quoting United States v. L. Cohen 
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 92–93 (1921)). 
160 Id. at 268–69 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 
(1926)).  
161 See id. at 266.  
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intermediate amounts, indeterminately, varying from time to time and 
dependent upon the class and kind of work done, the efficiency of the 
workmen.”163 The Court also found the statute’s use of the word 
“locality” particularly problematic, questioning: “Who can say, with 
any degree of accuracy, what areas constitute the locality where a 
given piece of work is being done?”164  
Further supporting its position, the Court in Connally pointed to 
the case of United States v. Capital Traction Co., a 1910 case out of 
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.165 In Capital 
Traction, the Court of Appeals held void for uncertainty a statute 
requiring railways to service passengers “without crowding,” because 
the statute failed to define the meaning of “crowding.”166  
In cases involving penal statutes, where a violator of the statute 
could be incarcerated or subject to costly fines, courts have especially 
stressed the importance of clarity in language.167 In the case of 
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court invalidated a New Jersey 
statute that stated:  
 
Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to 
be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, 
who has been convicted at least three times of being a 
disorderly person, or who has been convicted of any crime, in 
this or in any other State, is declared to be a gangster. Every 
violation is punishable by fine not exceeding $10,000 or 
imprisonment not exceeding 20 years, or both.168 
 
In its analysis, the Court pronounced that, “[n]o one may be required 
at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of 
                                                 
163 Id. at 393.  
164 Id. at 394.  
165 Id. at 392 (citing United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. D.C. 592 
(1910)). 
166 Id.  
167 See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).  
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penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State 
commands or forbids.”169 The Court found that the statue’s vague 
definition of “gang” as “consisting of two or more persons” failed to 
clearly inform people of the statute’s prohibitions.170 For a statute with 
penalties as steep as a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment of up to 
20 years, such an unclear definition could not be constitutionally 
tolerated.171  
Though the void for vagueness doctrine lacks a uniform 
definition, two important principles of the doctrine have continually 
resurfaced over time to guide its application: (1) the importance of fair 
notice; and (2) the need to prevent arbitrary enforcement.172 Fair 
notice is often defined in terms of the “common” man and his 
understanding of a law; that is, if the common man cannot understand 
the law upon reading it, then the law might be unconstitutional for 
vagueness.173 As early as 1875, the Court in United States v. Reese 
warned that, “[p]enal statutes ought not to be expressed in language so 
uncertain. If the legislature undertakes to define by statute a new 
offence, and provide for its punishment, it should express its will in 
language that need not deceive the common mind.”174  
The Court’s precedent demonstrates that the important policy 
concerns behind the void for vagueness doctrine may sometimes 
necessarily produce unjust results. For instance, in Reese, although a 
Kentucky electoral official prevented an African-American from 
voting in an election, the Court did not enforce a penalty against the 
official because the wording of the anti-discrimination statute lacked 
clarity in creating this new offense.175 Even though in the Reese case, 
                                                 
169 Id. at 453.   
170 Id. at 457–58.   
171 Id. at 453–58. 
172 See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (explaining that 
“[v]ague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning,” and adding that, 
“if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide 
explicit standards for those who apply them.”)  
173 Id. at 108.  
174 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220 (1939).  
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the doctrine may have reached an unjust conclusion, the court 
supported its reasoning with the idea that statutes must use clear and 
understandable language, such that the ordinary person will be put on 
notice of what the statute prohibits or requires.176 As recently as 2008, 
the Court reiterated this principle in United States v. Williams, noting 
that a statute fails for vagueness when it does not “provide a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.”177 
The prevention of arbitrary enforcement of law forms the second 
important principle to the void for vagueness doctrine.178 This 
principle gained favor in the 1970s, when it was highlighted in the 
case of Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville.179 In this case, the 
Supreme Court held void for vagueness a vagrancy law, which 
prohibited “persons wandering or strolling around from place to place 
without any lawful purpose or object.”180 Not only did the statute fail 
to give fair notice, the Court also found that the statute could prompt 
“harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, 
against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.”181 In 
other words, law enforcement could pick and choose when to enforce 
the law, potentially targeting disliked or marginalized groups.  
Later that year, the Court expanded upon this principle of the void 
for vagueness doctrine when it explained in the case of Grayned v. 
City of Rockford that, “if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is 
to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who 
apply them.”182 Such explicit standards allow for a uniform 
application of a statute, thus preventing officials from enforcing th
law in a discretionary and potentially unjust manner. Specifically, the 
e 
                                                 
176 Id.  
177 553 U.S. 285, 286 (2008). 
178 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108–09.  
179 Lockwood, supra note 152, at 272.  
180 Lockwood, supra note 152, at 272 (quoting Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 n.1 (1972)).  
181 Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 
97–98 (1940)).  
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Court in Grayned held that the following statute was not void for 
vagueness because it provided sufficient guidelines for enforcement:  
                                                
 
A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly: 
(i) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of 
any primary or secondary school building while the school is 
in session and one-half hour before the school is in session 
and one-half hour after the school session has been 
concluded, provided that this subsection does not prohibit the 
peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor 
dispute.183 
 
In support of its conclusion that the statute possessed sufficient 
certainty, the Court explained that the standards furnished by the 
statute prevented against “subjective or discriminatory enforcement,” 
such that “‘undesirables’ or their annoying conduct may not be 
punished” in a discriminatory fashion.184 Specifically, the court 
outlined that any potential vagueness in the statute “[was] dispelled by 
the ordinance’s requirements that (1) the ‘noise or diversion’ be 
actually incompatible with normal school activity; (2) there be a 
demonstrated causality between the disruption that occurs and the 
‘noise or diversion’; and (3) the acts be ‘willfully’ done.”185 Though 
the police retained some discretionary power, the court found that the 
guidelines in the statute overpowered the possibility of discriminatory 
enforcement by the police.186  
Though courts apply the doctrine according to its rationale, courts 
also apply the doctrine according to what it does not require of 
statutes: exactness. In the case of Nash, Justice Holmes famously 
highlighted the idea that statutes need not be perfectly clear, 
explaining that “[t]he law is full of instances where a man’s fate 
 
183 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
184 Id. at 113–14.  
185 Id.  
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depends on his estimating rightly.”187 Indeed, courts often reject void 
for vagueness challenges on the basis that mathematical certainty is 
not required of statutes.188 No set definition, however, exists as to how 
much specificity a statute must possess.189 As a result, courts are 
guided by this vague outer limit of the doctrine, generally finding that 
some vagueness is tolerated in statutes.190 
In statute writing, mathematical specificity must yield to practical 
considerations such as efficiency in drafting and flexibility in 
application.191 In Boyce Motor Co., the Supreme Court articulated that 
“no more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded” in a 
statute, explaining that “most statutes must deal with untold and 
unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities 
of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the 
specificity with which legislators can spell out prohibitions.”192 In 
other words, mathematical certainty cannot be required due to the 
practical limitations of the English language, in that words themselves 
possess their own limitations in their ability to describe.193 Moreover 
there are practical limitations of writing a statute that must be flexible 
enough to deal with situations that the legislature may not have 
considered at the time of enactment.194  
The Supreme Court in  United States Civil Service Commission v. 
National Association of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO affirmed this 
principle, stressing that “there are limitations in the English language 
with respect to being both specific and manageably brief . . . they are 
set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common 
                                                 
187 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1924). 
188 See Lockwood, supra note 152, at 270–71 (citing Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. 
v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952).   
189 See id.  
190 See id.  
191 Boyce, 342 U.S. at 340.  
192 Id.  
193 See id.  
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sense can sufficiently understand and comply with.”195 Thus, statutes 
must use language that is brief enough to be followed and understood 
by ordinary people, and for the sake of clarity, the language may fall 
short of mathematical precision.  
Thus, it is a well-established principle that statutes are allowed 
some vagueness and need not be perfectly precise. In applying the 
void for vagueness doctrine, therefore, courts are guided by this idea 
and are thus prone to tolerating some vagueness in a statute’s 
language. The closest definition provided for the requisite level of 
specificity has been that of a “reasonable degree of certainty.”196 This 
definition, however, fails to provide a meaningful benchmark for the 
level of vagueness to be tolerated. As a result of this nebulous 
definition, courts have often applied the doctrine in widely varying 
ways, which has led to inconsistency in the judicial system.  
While there is no uniform definition of the level of vagueness 
required for a statute to be void, several rules have developed over 
time that guide the courts in applying the doctrine. These rules allot 
differing levels of vagueness in statutes based upon the kind or type of 
statute at hand, as “[t]he degree of vagueness that the Constitution 
tolerates—as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair 
enforcement depends in part on the nature of the enactment.”197  
One rule provides that civil statutes often demand less clarity than 
criminal statutes.198 In particular, civil statutes affecting economic 
regulations typically require less certainty in terms.199 As noted by the 
Court in Village of Hoffman Estates, “Economic regulation is subject 
to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more 
narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan 
                                                 
195 See Lockwood, supra note 152, at 271 (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. 
Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 578–79 (1973)).  
196See Lockwood, supra note 152, at 272 (citing Boyce, 342 U.S. at 340). The 
author implies that the best approximation that the Court has provided regarding the 
necessary specificity is simply “a reasonable degree of certainty.” See Id.   
197 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 498 (1982). 
198Id. at 498–499.   
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behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in 
advance of action.”200 Conversely, criminal statutes generally 
necessitate greater clarity than civil cases because the consequences 
are generally greater in criminal cases.201 For example, a scienter 
requirement in a criminal statute is an example of the level of 
specificity required by a criminal statutes, as the intent is clearly 
defined in such a provision and therefore mitigates any potential 
vagueness.202  
The requirement that criminal statutes possess greater clarity 
works together with the fair notice rationale behind the void for 
vagueness doctrine. Courts examining criminal statutes seem to place 
a great deal of emphasis on this fair notice requirement—even more so 
than in civil statutes.203 The 1945 case of Screws v. United States 
proclaimed the import of fair notice in criminal statutes, noting that 
“[t]he constitutional requirement that a criminal statute be definite 
serves a high function. It gives a person acting with reference to the 
statute fair warning that his conduct is within its prohibition.”204 
Therefore, when dealing with a criminal statute, more specificity is 
likely required because the ordinary person must have fair notice of 
the criminal penalties that may be imposed upon him or her. The 
stakes in a criminal case are far greater than those in a civil case, and 
as a result, more specificity is required in order to provide adequate 
notice.  
Another rule mandates that more specificity is required in a 
statute that threatens constitutionally protected rights.205 The court in 
Okpalobi noted this principle, stating, “A vague law is especially 
problematic . . . when, as here, the uncertainty induced by the statute 
                                                 
200Id.  
201See, e.g., Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the 
Constitution tolerates a lesser degree of vagueness in enactments “with criminal 
rather than civil penalties because the consequences of imprecision are more 
severe.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
202 Village of Hoffman Estates, 405 U.S. at 499.  
203 See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103–04 (1945).  
204 Id.  
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threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.”206 
Further, this rule arguably takes precedence over the civil versus 
criminal distinction, as the Court noted in Hoffman Estates that 
“perhaps the most important factor affecting the clarity that the 
Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the 
exercise of constitutionally protected rights.”207 Moreover, within the 
realm of constitutionally protected rights, First Amendment rights 
seem to be the most fiercely guarded against indefiniteness.208 The 
Court observed in Hoffman Estates that “[i]f for example, the law 
interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more 
stringent vagueness test should apply.”209 Therefore, a strict standard 
of vagueness is applicable to the Illinois Silent Reflection and Student 
Prayer Act, given that it calls into question the rights provided in the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  
Another rule specifically applicable to the case of Sherman v. 
Koch is the idea that courts generally tolerate more vagueness in 
statutes affecting state school systems.210 By allowing more vagueness 
in school laws, teachers are able to exercise discretion and implement 
the laws in ways that meet the individualized needs of the school or 
classroom.211 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out 
that “[g]iven the school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary 
sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the 
educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as 
detailed as a criminal code.”212  
Conflicting with this idea of tolerance, however, is the fact that 
the Supreme Court has mandated that courts be “particularly vigilant 
                                                 
206 190 F.3d 337, 358 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 
379, 391 (1979) (internal quotations omitted)). 
207 Village of Hoffman Estates, 405 U.S. at 499. 
208 See, e.g., id.  
209 Id.  
210 See, e.g., Sherman I, 594 F. Supp. 2d 981, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
211 See, e.g., Fuller ex rel. Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 
61, 251 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2001).  
212 Id. at 667 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser ex rel. Fraser, 478 
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to monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in public 
elementary and secondary schools.”213 The Supreme Court has made 
clear that because students in primary and second education are 
“impressionable and their attendance is involuntary,” statutes with a 
potential effect on the Establishment Clause must be watched 
closely.214  
Moment of silence legislation is therefore subject to somewhat 
conflicting standards of review with regard to being void for 
vagueness. On the one hand, the legislation is civil and therefore less 
clarity is required than in a criminal statute imposing criminal 
penalties. On the other hand, the legislation arguably threatens First 
Amendment rights pursuant to the Establishment Clause. In regards to 
the case of Sherman v. Koch, while legislation affecting public schools 
is generally accorded deference, the Supreme Court requires a 
heightened review for school legislation that potential infringes upon 
the Establishment Clause.  
 
VI. APPLICATION OF THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE TO THE  
ILLINOIS SILENT REFLECTION AND STUDENT PRAYER ACT 
 
In applying the void for vagueness doctrine to the Illinois Silent 
Reflection and Student Prayer Act, it is helpful to first assess the 
statute in light of the doctrine’s rationale. Does the statute promote the 
two key principles behind the void for vagueness doctrine, such that it 
provides fair notice and protects against arbitrary enforcement? First, 
does the statute provide fair warning such that an ordinary man will 
know what is mandated by the statute?215 As noted above, the Illinois 
Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act, provides in pertinent part 
that:  
 
                                                 
213 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987).  
214 See, e.g., Sherman I, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 991. 
215 See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220 (1939) (emphasizing fair 
notice such that “[e]very man should be able to know with certainty when he is 
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In each public school classroom the teacher in charge shall 
observe a brief period of silence with the participation of all 
the pupils therein assembled at the opening of every school 
day. This period shall be an opportunity for silent prayer or 
for silent reflection on the anticipated activities of the day.216  
 
First looking to the language of a “brief period,” would an 
ordinary man understand the meaning of this phrase? Aside from 
labeling it as “brief,” the statute neither defines the time period nor 
imposes a time limit on it. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit admitted that, 
“Section 1 does not define the length of the period of silence.”217 
Without explaining why, however, the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
“[a] student of ordinary intelligence would clearly understand that he 
is to remain silent for the fifteen seconds between the announcement 
and the beginning of the Pledge.”218  
But, what is the meaning of a “brief period?” Is it fifteen seconds, 
one minute, five minutes? Within the school context, the word 
“period” often refers to the length of a class. In this case, could the 
phrase “brief period” be interpreted by an ordinary person to mean 
thirty minutes? While the Illinois legislature declined to place a 
maximum time limit on the “brief period,” a survey of other moment 
of silence legislation indicates that a time limit is commonly used to 
define the moment.219 Specifically, state legislatures have commonly 
required a one-minute time limit in similar moment of silence 
statutes.220 While not determinative, the time limit imposed on other 
moment of silence legislation is indicative of the idea that this time 
limit helps define the moment for the ordinary person. Why would so 
                                                 
216 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 20/1 (2007) (emphasis added).  
217 Sherman II, 623 F.3d 501, 520 (7th Cir. 2010).  
218 Id.   
219See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985); Croft v. Perry, 562 
F.3d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 270 (4th Cir. 2001); 
Bown v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464, 1466 (11th Cir. 1997); May v. 
Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 241 (3rd Cir. 1985).  
220See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40; Croft, 562 F.3d at 738; Gilmore, 258 F.3d 
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many states include this guidance if the ordinary person already knew 
how long the moment should be?  
Section 1 of the Act also neglects to provide a mechanism for 
enforcement of the statute. The lack of an enforcement mechanism 
raises serious questions about the implementation of the Act. For 
example, what consequences apply to the teacher who implements the 
statute incorrectly? Or, what happens to a student who does not 
comply with the two choices of either silently praying or reflecting 
upon the day’s activities? The lack of an enforcement mechanism 
leaves the ordinary person in the dark as to the consequences of non-
compliance.  
The other central principle behind the void for vagueness doctrine 
is the prevention of the arbitrary enforcement of laws.221 By writing 
statutes with clear and specific language, the legislature can prevent 
the possibility that a specific statute is applied in an unfair or 
discriminatory manner.222 The Illinois Silent Reflection and Student 
Prayer Act, however, possesses scant guidance with regard to its 
implementation. The district court noted this very fact, commenting 
that the Act “provide[d] no direction as to how the ‘period’ of silence 
should be implemented, how long the period should last, and whether 
pupils would be permitted to pray in a manner that was either audible 
or required movement.” 223 
Therefore, the Act’s failure to define a “brief period” not only 
neglects to provide adequate notice; its lack of guidelines could also 
lead to the arbitrary enforcement of the law. Unlike the carefully 
defined standards expressed in the statute involved in Grayned,224 the 
Illinois statute does not delineate any course of conduct that would 
clearly indicate that a person violated the Act. The only guidance 
provided is that the teacher lead the students at the opening of the day 
and that students either silently reflect or pray. If a teacher or school 
                                                 
221 See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972).  
222 Id. at 108.  
223 Sherman I, 594 F. Supp. 2d 981, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
224 See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110–113 (concluding that the statutory 
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incorrectly implements the statute, the enforcement against such 
misconduct would be entirely discretionary and arbitrary, as no 
penalties or enforcement mechanisms are given in the statute. Just as 
in the Papachristou case, concerns are raised by the amount of 
discretionary power granted by this statute—discretion resting both 
with the teachers that implement the statute, as well as with whatever 
powers that might enforce the statute.  
In this situation, the arbitrary enforcement of the law could lead to 
grave consequences, including the threatening of students’ 
constitutionally protected rights. With the help of guidelines in a 
moment of silence statute, the teachers and schools implementing the 
statute will be prevented from enforcing the law in a discretionary 
manner that could infringe upon constitutional rights. The Illinois 
Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act, however, fails to provide 
such guidelines, thus providing wide discretionary power to teachers 
and potentially yielding arbitrary and even illegal implementation of 
the statute.  
Some schools may choose not to enforce the statute (as many 
Chicago schools have done), or some schools might implement the 
period for longer lengths of time than others. A teacher could, for 
example, bring a religious object, such as a rosary, into the classroom 
for use during the moment of silence, or make off-hand comments to 
students regarding religion. In a more serious case, a teacher could 
potentially indoctrinate students in his or her own beliefs by providing 
religious materials to the students or leading them in prayer. In any 
case, the introduction of the teacher’s religious beliefs is 
unconstitutional, regardless of the magnitude of the violation. 
Furthermore, the lack of an enforcement clause in the statute could 
potentially allow for teachers to violate the statute without 
repercussion. 
In terms of an enforcement mechanism, however, most moment of 
silence statutes do not possess a clear delineation of penalties.225 The 
lack of an enforcement clause, however, seems to be less damning 
                                                 
225See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40; Croft, 562 F.3d at 738; Gilmore, 258 F.3d 
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when schools and teachers receive guidelines regarding the moment of 
silence, such as a time limit for the period.226 When teachers know the 
confines of the moment of silence, there is arguably less need for an 
enforcement clause because their compliance will be greater. 
Overall, it is difficult to find that the statute promotes the 
principles behind the void for vagueness doctrine. The lack of a time 
limit, the absence of guidelines as to how the teacher shall implement 
the statute, as well as the lack of an enforcement clause, neither 
provides fair notice to those who will potentially violate the statute, 
nor provides for a uniform implementation of the statute. Based upon 
the rationale of the void for vagueness doctrine, the Illinois statute 
shows itself to be in position to fail for vagueness because it threatens 
both of the principles that the doctrine espouses.  
How much vagueness should be tolerated in the Illinois Silent 
Reflection and Student Prayer Act? To answer this question, it is 
essential to ask whether the statute provides “a reasonable degree of 
certainty.”227 As noted above, while a statute need not be 
mathematically precise, a statute must be expressed in certain enough 
terms that an ordinary person can understand the applicable statutory 
terms.228 The Seventh Circuit held that the statute possessed sufficient 
certainty.229 The reasons explored above, however, demonstrate that an 
ordinary student could fail to understand the exact requirements of the 
Illinois statute.230  
Admittedly, due to practical limitations of the English language, 
statutes cannot always be written with the utmost precision. 231 
Furthermore, legislators writing statutes may find it more efficient to 
                                                 
226 See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40; Croft, 562 F.3d at 738; Gilmore, 258 
F.3d at 270; Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d at 1466; May,780 F.2d at 241.  
227See Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952); see 
also Lockwood, supra note 152, at 270–71.  
228 Lockwood, supra note 152, at 271.   
229 Sherman II, 623 F.3d 501, 520 (7th Cir. 2010). 
230 See id.  
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write with more vagueness, so that statutes can be implemented 
flexibly.232  
Another efficiency argument for vagueness is that legislators also 
do not have endless amounts of time to draft statutes with the greatest 
exactitude. The lack of guidelines in the Illinois Silent Reflection and 
Student Prayer Act afford a flexible implementation of the statute that 
can accommodate unique circumstances, such as individual schools’ 
schedules or procedures. On the other hand, if other moment of silence 
statutes can provide these helpful guidelines, is the deficiency in the 
statute truly a result of the practical limitations of the English language 
or efficiency in drafting?  
For further guidance as to how much vagueness will be permitted 
in the statute, it is helpful to apply the various rules of construction of 
the void for vagueness doctrine to it. The nature of the enactment may 
dictate whether the statute indeed possesses enough certainty.233  
Turning first to the civil versus criminal dichotomy, the statute 
falls into the civil category and, therefore, requires less certainty in its 
wording than a criminal statute.234 However, it is interesting in this 
case that the Illinois Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act actually 
does not provide any course of action for noncompliance. 
Consequences would not approximate those stemming from a criminal 
statute. Therefore, the Illinois statute need not possess the same 
amount of clarity as a criminal statute. Accordingly, as fair notice is 
more integral to criminal statutes, the importance of fair notice is 
lessened. Thus, in terms of the civil versus criminal distinction, it 
would seem that the amount of vagueness in the Illinois statute may be 
tolerable.  
The level of specificity that should be required in the Illinois 
Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act, however, changes drastically 
in light of the rule that statutes threatening constitutional rights require 
                                                 
232See id.  
233 See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 498–99 (1982) (explaining that criminal statutes require a higher degree of 
specificity than civil statutes). 
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the utmost clarity. As the Supreme Court explained, these types of 
statutes are held to a higher standard of clarity than criminal 
statutes.235 Under this rationale, the vague language of the Illinois 
statute falls short of the requisite specificity because it potentially 
threatens students’ First Amendment rights under the Establishment 
Clause. Additionally, the magnitude of this threat depends almost 
entirely on a teacher’s implementation of the Act. As explored above, 
if a teacher implements the statute by incorporating his or her own 
beliefs, then the students’ freedom from the establishment of religion 
in public institutions would be violated.  
Indeed, the threat is real with the Illinois statute because little is 
provided in terms of implementation, leaving discretion with the 
teachers and schools. The lack of an enforcement clause further 
threatens constitutional rights: If these rights are violated, there is no 
matter of recourse outlined in the statute for stopping such an unlawful 
implementation.236 In light of the rule requiring a greater degree of 
specificity for statutes threatening constitutional rights, it is evident 
that the Illinois statute does not provide sufficient clarity to address the 
potential constitutional violations implicated by the vague statutory 
language.  
In applying the void for vagueness doctrine to the Illinois Silent 
Reflection and Student Prayer Act, it is important to also apply the 
rules that are applicable to the interpretation of school legislation. As 
emphasized by the Seventh Circuit, statutes affecting schools must 
allow discretion to schools so that teachers can implement statutes in 
ways that best suit their students and schools.237 In this sense, the 
Illinois statute passes the test, as it certainly provides teachers with 
broad discretion to implement the statute in the manners that they see 
fit. However, it is important to consider that statutes affecting schools 
                                                 
235See Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 (declaring that the most 
stringent test should apply to statutes that potentially infringe upon constitutionally 
protected rights). 
236 See 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 20/1 (2007).   
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must also be held to a heightened standard of specificity when 
constitutional rights are being called into question.238  
Statutes potentially threatening constitutional rights of students 
must be held to an even stricter standard because studies have 
demonstrated that school children are particularly impressionable and 
vulnerable to various influences in the school environment.239 At this 
age, children are likely to emulate the actions of their teachers. 
Moreover, children are especially vulnerable because their attendance 
at public school is mandatory. Given this combination of factors, it is 
important to ensure that the constitutional rights of schoolchildren 
receive greater protection, as children may often lack the ability to 
recognize a violation of their constitutional rights—much less defend 
against such violations.240  
The problem here is simple: When children are required to attend 
school, and a teacher implements the moment of silence in a manner 
that promotes her own ideological beliefs, students may feel 
compelled or pressured to follow the same beliefs of the teacher. With 
its lack of guidelines, the Illinois Silent Reflection and Student Prayer 
Act lends itself to this situation. As a result, the statute fails for 
vagueness.  
Although school legislation should give discretion to teachers, it 
must provide stricter guidelines when the constitutionally protected 
rights of children are called into question. Given that First Amendment 
Establishment Clause rights are indeed called into question, the statute 




An in depth analysis of the Illinois Silent Reflection and Student 
Prayer Act indicates that there are arguments on either side of why or 
why not the Act possesses sufficient clarity. Upon reviewing all of the 
                                                 
238See, e.g, Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (statute 
implicating freedom of religion). 
239 Sherman I, 594 F. Supp. 2d 981, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
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opposing factors in tandem, however, it is ultimately clear that the 
reasons pointing to a finding of unconstitutionality outweigh the 
others, thus failing the statute for vagueness. While it is troubling to 
see that the Seventh Circuit did not reach this conclusion, it is even 
more disturbing to see how very little analysis the Seventh Circuit 
engaged in to decide the issue. While the Seventh Circuit provided a 
thorough analysis of the Establishment Clause issue raised by the 
statute, I leave for another day a more complete discussion of the 
court’s reasoning behind this issue.  
With regard to the void for vagueness challenge, however, rather 
than providing a thorough analysis, the Seventh Circuit skewed its 
reasoning by conveniently highlighting factors that leaned in favor of a 
finding of constitutionality.241 The court’s analysis neglected to focus 
on certain factors that overwhelmingly pointed in favor of a finding of 
constitutional infirmity, namely that the statute arguably fails to 
provide fair notice, leads to arbitrary enforcement, and calls into 
question constitutional rights—specifically, the First Amendment 
rights—of children in public schools.  
The Seventh Circuit’s misapplication of the doctrine, however, 
may in part be contributed to by the vagueness of the void for 
vagueness doctrine itself. Case law fails to clearly delineate the rules 
and nuances of the doctrine, and as a result, courts are left to pick and 
choose parts of the doctrine. Unfortunately, it is only after applying all 
of the considerations and nuances of the doctrine that a proper 
conclusion to a void for vagueness challenge may be reached. 
This cursory type of application has led to widely varying 
applications of the doctrine among the courts.242 The wide spectrum of 
application, furthermore, indicates a larger problem, in that courts 
likely utilize the doctrine to help them reach a predetermined result. 
Far from being confused about the doctrine, courts seem to use the 
doctrine in such varying manners because it serves as “an available 
                                                 
241 Sherman II, 623 F.3d at 519–520.  
242 See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 67, 72–73 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting the “number 




Vales: Stuck in a Moment (of Silence): The Seventh Circuit's Misapplicat
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2011
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 6, Issue 2                         Spring 2011 
 
instrument in the service of other more determinative judicially felt 
needs and pressures.”243 Therefore, depending on how the doctrine 
suits its needs, a court might dismiss the void for vagueness doctrine 
as a “makeweight” argument, or it might uphold it as the ratio 
decidendi.244  
Indeed, decisions applying the void for vagueness doctrine have 
been characterized by their “almost habitual lack of informed 
reasoning.”245 For example:  
 
It is common in the cases which sustain a statute against the 
charge of vagueness to say merely that it is as definite as a 
statute sustained in some earlier case—an argument which, in 
view of the fact that the earlier case expresses no criterion of 
definiteness, is singularly unillumintating. Other cases state 
only their conclusion—that the statute is too uncertain (or not 
too uncertain)—and cite in support earlier decisions, not 
dealing with statutes of similar wording or even of similar 
sphere of operation, but rather laying down the broadly 
phrased, black letter, polar doctrines.246 
 
Finally, what motivated the Seventh Circuit’s incomplete 
analysis? After providing such a thorough analysis of why the Act did 
not violate the Establishment Clause, the court then brushed over the 
void for vagueness issue.247 Seemingly determined to find that no First 
Amendment violation occurred, the court quickly concluded that the 
statute passed constitutional muster in all respects.248 While the inner 
                                                 
243Id. at 74–75.  
244Id. at 72. The Ratio Decidendi is “[t]he principle or rule of law on which a 
court’s decision is founded.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
245Void-for-Vagueness, supra note 241, at 70.  
246 Id. at 71.  
247 The court devoted pages 507–519 of its analysis to the issue of the 
constitutionality of the statute under the Establishment Clause, while devoting just 
one page, 519–520, to the issue of the constitutionality of the statute according to the 
void for vagueness doctrine. See Sherman II, 623 F.3d 501, 507–520 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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thoughts and motivations of the court may not be known, upon looking 
at the hurried and unbalanced analysis of the void for vagueness issue, 
it would seem that the court set itself on coming to a finding of 
constitutionality. Whether the court’s religious beliefs or conservatism 
dictated this result is not known, but the issue can surely be called into 
question.  
The void for vagueness doctrine as it stands now is in need of a 
uniform definition. The lack of uniformity in its definition will 
continue to allow the doctrine to be a tool used for reaching judicially 
predetermined outcomes.249 This not only discredits the doctrine, but 
also can lead to the reaching of unfair and constitutionally incorrect 
outcomes. An incomplete analysis of this doctrine, therefore, has 
serious consequences. Indeed, in the case of Sherman v. Koch, the 
consequence can be seen as the violation of the constitutional rights of 
students across the state of Illinois.  
                                                 
249See Void-for-Vagueness, supra note 241, at 75.  
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